Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62602
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dc.contributor.authorDe Clippel, Geoffroyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:30:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:30:39Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62602-
dc.description.abstractMost contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities. This comes in sharp contrast with standards in most other branches of economic theory. The present paper shows how Nash's original axiomatic system can be rephrased in a natural class of economic environments with lotteries, and how his uniqueness result can be recovered, provided one completes the system with a property of independence with respect to preferences over unfeasible alternatives. A similar result can be derived for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if and only if bargaining may involve multiple goods. The paper also introduces a distinction between welfarism and cardinal welfarism, and emphasizes that the Nash solution is ordinally invariant on the class of von Neumann-Morgensterm preferences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics |x2009-5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordWelfarismen_US
dc.subject.keywordNashen_US
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Smorodinskyen_US
dc.subject.keywordExpected Utilityen_US
dc.titleAxiomatic bargaining on economic enviornments with lotteriesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn61292064Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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