Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62532
Authors: 
De la Croix, David
Mariani, Fabio
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6599
Abstract: 
Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy.
Subjects: 
marriage
polygyny
monogamy
divorce
human capital
political economy
JEL: 
J12
O17
Z13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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