Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62457 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 6620
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
Subjects: 
public goods
competition
tournament
cooperation
voting
JEL: 
D72
J33
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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