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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62446
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gill, David | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Prowse, Victoria L. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vlassopoulos, Michael | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-08-01 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-14T11:06:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-09-14T11:06:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62446 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme based on random bonuses makes them cheat more but has no effect on their productivity. We also find that more productive workers behave more dishonestly. We explain how these results suggest that workers' cheating behavior responds to the perceived fairness of their employer's compensation scheme. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6725 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | bonus | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | compensation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | cheating | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dishonesty | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | lying | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | employee crime | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | productivity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | slider task | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | real effort | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsentgelt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsproduktivität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsplatz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Betrug | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 720436516 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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