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dc.contributor.authorYanez-Pagans, Monicaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMachicado, Carlos Gustavoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-14T11:06:08Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-14T11:06:08Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62436-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines bureaucratic delay within the allocation of small infrastructure projects by sub-municipal governments in Bolivia, and it presents a randomized field experiment designed to improve public service delivery by promoting voice, transparency, and accountability among grassroots organizations. The experiment consists of randomly providing sub-municipal governments with a mailing tracking system, which provides public officials and grassroots organizations real- time information about the processing of small infrastructure projects requests by sub-municipal governments. The objective of this intervention is twofold. First, is to facilitate the involvement of grassroots organizations in the process of reviewing, tracking, and monitoring small infrastructure project allocations. Second, is to explicitly alter the probability of detecting inefficient administrative practices within district councils and, therefore, to implicitly increase the expected cost of engaging in such practices among public officials. The findings of this paper suggest that monitoring tools that promote access to information by citizens might play a critical role in improving public service delivery outcomes. Yet, in settings where mechanisms of local accountability are subject to be captured by local elites or are weak, monitoring tools might have limited capacity to improve outcomes. In such settings, major transparency related reforms might be needed to improve public service delivery outcomes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6687en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.jelH76en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBoliviaen_US
dc.subject.keywordtransparencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordaccountabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordlocal-level monitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordbureaucratic delayen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunale Infrastrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwInfrastrukturpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwBürokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwBürgerbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwBolivienen_US
dc.titleBureaucratic delay, local-level monitoring, and delivery of small infrastructure projects: Evidence from a field experiment in Boliviaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn719145473en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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