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Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62255
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| Title: | | Auctions and corruption  |
| Authors: | | Lengwiler, Yvan Wolfstetter, Elmar |
| Issue Date: | | 2000 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,40 |
| Abstract: | | In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. |
| Subjects: | | auctions procurement corruption collusion coalitions |
| JEL: | | D44 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047498 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin
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