Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62213
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.contributor.authorEngelmann, Dirken_US
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wielanden_US
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-07T15:39:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-07T15:39:59Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047125en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62213-
dc.description.abstractIn theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of which side of the market it is levied on. This principle of liability side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted-offer markets to test liability side equivalence. We find that market outcomes are essentially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on buyers. Prices in both treatments are slightly above the competitive equilibrium. Thus we cannot reject liability side equivalence.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aHumboldt-Universität |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |x2000,8en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelC99en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax Liabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordPosted Offer Marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Economicsen_US
dc.titleTax liability side equivalence in experimental posted-offer marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn722935692en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:sfb373:20008-

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