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dc.contributor.authorJeitschko, Thomas D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-07T15:38:47Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-07T15:38:47Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047229en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62158-
dc.description.abstractWe consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,18en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen_US
dc.titleAuctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideasen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn723718679en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:sfb373:200018-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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