EconStor >
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin >
Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62158
  
Title:Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas PDF Logo
Authors:Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Issue Date:1999
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,18
Abstract:We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.
Subjects:auctions
procurement
JEL:D44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047229
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
723718679.pdf188.06 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62158

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.