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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62141
  

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dc.contributor.authorKempf, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.authorPütz, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.authorSonnenburg, Florianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-06T12:59:53Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-06T12:59:53Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62141-
dc.description.abstractAgency conflicts can arise when a fund manager also chairs the board of the fund. We examine the consequences of this fund manager duality using a broad sample of single managed US equity funds. We find that duality managers significantly underperform non-duality managers. This underperformance results from duality funds in the bottom performance quintile. This suggests that duality managers can avoid being laid off despite their bad performance. Consistent with this lower risk of dismissal, duality managers follow more risky investment strategies. They choose more unsystematic risk and follow more extreme investment styles which lead to more extreme performance outcomes. Only about one fifth of the nonduality managers invest as extremely as the average duality manager. However, all these consequences of manager duality can be cured by hiring independent directors.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCentre for Financial Research Cologneen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFR Working Paper 12-06en_US
dc.subject.jelG23en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFund manager dualityen_US
dc.subject.keywordFund governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordAgency conflictsen_US
dc.subject.keywordMutual fundsen_US
dc.titleFund manager duality: Impact on performance and investment behavioren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn722216696en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1206-
Appears in Collections:CFR Working Papers, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Universität Köln

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