Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62131
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dc.contributor.authorAndor, Marken_US
dc.contributor.authorFlinkerbusch, Kaien_US
dc.contributor.authorVoß, Achimen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-06T12:42:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-06T12:42:52Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62131-
dc.description.abstractIn this article we show how different promotion schemes for renewables affect economic welfare. Our starting point is that external benefits of renewable electricity supply besides the abatement of greenhouse gases are not related to actual electricity generation but to producing and installing capacity. We argue that generation based subsidies such as feed-in tariffs and bonus payments can only be a second-best solution. Our model framework allows us to explain how these second-best instruments cause welfare losses in an environment of volatile demand. We postulate that capacity payments for renewables should be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary social costs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCAWM |cMünsteren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCAWM Discussion Paper, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster |x59en_US
dc.subject.jelQ41en_US
dc.subject.jelQ48en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRenewable Energy Sourcesen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnergy Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordPromotion Instrumentsen_US
dc.titleQuantities vs. capacities: Minimizing the social cost of renewable energy promotionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn723878978en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cawmdp:59-

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