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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62126
  

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dc.contributor.authorCasajus, Andréen_US
dc.contributor.authorHüttner, Franken_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T15:19:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T15:19:18Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62126-
dc.description.abstractThe Shapley value certainly is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players non-negative payoffs whenever the grand coalition's worth is non-negative. Second, the equal treatment property is strengthened into desirability. This way, we obtain a new characterization of the class of egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. We complement this result by characterizations of the class of generalized consensus values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal surplus division solution.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Leipzigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper, Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 113en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelD60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSolidarityen_US
dc.subject.keywordegalitarian Shapley valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordequal division valueen_US
dc.subject.keyworddesirabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized consensus valueen_US
dc.titleNull players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley valuesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn722035187en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:leiwps:113-
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