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Title:Strategic delegation in price competition PDF Logo
Authors:Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 43
Abstract:We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms' surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents employed by the firms.
Subjects:Strategic delegation
Agency theory
Revenue sharing
JEL:C72
L22
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-63740
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance

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