Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62044
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dc.contributor.authorStoll, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorZöttl, Gregoren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T08:15:19Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T08:15:19Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62044-
dc.description.abstractThe outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the bidders, on buyers welfare and platform turnovers. First we show that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals characteristics and the buyers preferences over those non-price characteristics. In a counterfactual analysis we then analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. As we find, platform turnovers would decrease from around 10 million euros to around 7 million euros and the buyers welfare would increase by the monetary equivalent of around 2.7 million euros.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Procurement |xB05-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleInformation Disclosure in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Studyen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn73147449X-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62044-

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