Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62041 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Organization Theory: Committees and Corruption No. E19-V3
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Abstract: 
What is the optimal size of expert committees? To address this question, I present a model of a committee of experts with career concerns. Each expert may observe an argument about the state of the world and is unsure about the argument s soundness. Experts may remain silent or compete for the opportunity to announce an argument. I show that experts become more reluctant to speak in larger committees. This effect is sufficiently strong to make small groups of experts optimal.
JEL: 
D71
D82
D70
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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