Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62035
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRannenberg, Ansgaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T08:15:05Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T08:15:05Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62035-
dc.description.abstractI add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the overall economy to monetary policy and productivity shocks. It allows my model to match the volatility and correlation with output of the external finance premium, bank leverage, entrepreneurial leverage and other variables in US data better than a BGG-type model. A reasonably calibrated combination of balance sheet shocks produces a downturn of a magnitude similar to the "Great Recession".en_US
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Banking and Macroeconomics |xB15-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelE20en_US
dc.subject.jelE44en_US
dc.subject.jelE30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleAsymmetric Information in Credit Markets, Bank Leverage Cycles and Macroeconomic Dynamicsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn730347079-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62035-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.16 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.