Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62029
Authors: 
Aichele, Markus F.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Antitrust Issues and Competition C21-V1
Abstract: 
Assuming deterministic demand Liski and Montero (2006) show that forward trading is able to facilitate collusion. We present a more concise model incorporating the main reason for forward trading: Uncertainty. In general, fl uctuations make collusion harder to sustain (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). However, using forward contracts, firms are able to decrease the incentives to deviate from a collusive agreement even in very volatile markets. This makes collusive strategies more sustainable and decreases social welfare.
JEL: 
L40
D43
K21
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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