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Sonderforschungsbereich 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61755
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| Title: | | Through trial & error to collusion  |
| Authors: | | Huck, Steffen Oechssler, Jörg Normann, Hans-Theo |
| Issue Date: | | 1999 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1999,57 |
| Abstract: | | In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome. |
| JEL: | | C72 L13 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046474 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin
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