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Title:Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions PDF Logo
Authors:Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Issue Date:1998
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1998,62
Abstract:We analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects in the form of stochastic economies or diseconomies of scale. We show that economies give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices, whereas the converse is not generally true. Moreover, first- and second-price auctions are not always revenue equivalent. Indeed, economies of scale make the second-price format more profitable for the seller, whereas revenue equivalence holds in the case of diseconomies.
sequential auctions
economies of scale
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060022
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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