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Title:A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction PDF Logo
Authors:Perry, Motty
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Zamir, Shmuel
Issue Date:1998
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1998,63
Abstract:This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060032
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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