Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61249
Authors: 
Perry, Motty
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Zamir, Shmuel
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1998,63
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
Subjects: 
Auctions
JEL: 
D44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
70.52 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.