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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorGould, Matthewen_US
dc.contributor.authorRablen, Matthewen_US
dc.contributor.authorVreeland, James Raymonden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-20T10:37:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-20T10:37:43Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/61040-
dc.description.abstractThe United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks - election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 3902en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.jelF55en_US
dc.subject.jelO19en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnited Nations Security Councilen_US
dc.subject.keywordturn-taking normen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Sicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleThe determinants of election to the United Nations Security Councilen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn720738806en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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