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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61034
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| Title: | | Provision of a public good with altruistic overlapping generations and many tribes  |
| Authors: | | Karp, Larry S. |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo Working Paper: Energy and Climate Economics 3895 |
| Abstract: | | Intergenerational altruism and contemporaneous cooperation are both important to the provision of long-lived public goods. Equilibrium climate protection may depend more sensitively on either of these considerations, depending on the type of policy rule one examines. This conclusion is based on a model with n tribes, each with a sequence of overlapping generations. Tribal members discount their and their descendants' utility at different rates. Agents in the resulting game are indexed by tribal affiliation and the time at which they act. The Markov Perfect equilibrium is found by solving a control problem with a constant discount rate and an endogenous annuity. |
| Subjects: | | overlapping generations altruism time consistency Markov Perfection differential games climate policy |
| JEL: | | C73 D62 D63 D64 H41 Q54 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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