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Title:On the private provision of contentious public characteristics PDF Logo
Authors:Cornes, Richard
Rübbelke, Dirk
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3881
Abstract:We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.
Subjects:public goods
public bads
aggregative games
JEL:C72
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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