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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61023
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| Title: | | On the private provision of contentious public characteristics  |
| Authors: | | Cornes, Richard Rübbelke, Dirk |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3881 |
| Abstract: | | We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties. |
| Subjects: | | public goods public bads aggregative games |
| JEL: | | C72 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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