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dc.contributor.authorNygard Bergh, Haralden_US
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen_US
dc.contributor.authorReme, Bjørn-Atleen_US
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Larsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-20T10:36:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-20T10:36:58Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/61007-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze strategic interactions between two competing distributors of an independent TV channel. Consistent with most of the relevant markets, we assume that the distributors set end-user prices while the TV channel sets advertising prices. Within this framework we show that the distributors have incentives to internalize the fact that viewers dislike ads on TV, but no incentives to internalize how the TV-channel's profits from the advertising market are affected by end-user prices. This leads to some surprising results. First, we show that even undifferentiated distributors might make positive profits. Second, a TV channel might find it optimal to commit to not raising advertising revenue. Third, regulation of the advertising volume might be welfare improving even if the unregulated advertising level is too low from a social point of view.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo Working Paper: Industrial Organisation 3885en_US
dc.subject.jelL10en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordTV industryen_US
dc.subject.stwFernsehsenderen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwFernsehwerbungen_US
dc.subject.stwRundfunkfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCompetition between content distributors in two-sided marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn720711231en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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