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Title:Nice guys finish last: Are people with higher tax morale taxed more heavily? PDF Logo
Authors:Philipp Doerrenberg
Denvil Duncan
Clemens Fuest
Andreas Peichl
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3858
Abstract:This paper provides evidence of efficient taxation of groups with heterogeneous levels of tax morale. We set up an optimal income tax model where high tax morale implies a high subjective cost of evading taxes. The model predicts that nice guys finish last: groups with higher tax morale will be taxed more heavily, simply because taxing them is less costly. Based on unique cross-country micro data and an IV approach to rule out reverse causality, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. Income groups with high tax morale systematically face higher average and marginal tax rates. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate whether differences in tax morale affect the distribution of the tax burden across different groups of taxpayers.
Subjects:tax morale
tax compliance
optimal taxation
political economy
JEL:H20
H30
D70
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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