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Title:Private protection against crime when property value is private information PDF Logo
Authors:Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3888
Abstract:This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. Within a framework in which potential criminals can choose between various crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead to suboptimal levels of investment in private protection. Specifically, suboptimal investment can occur when observable precautions communicate information about property value to potential offenders, even when the diversion effect of private safety measures is taken into account.
JEL:D62
K42
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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