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dc.contributor.authorJus, Darkoen_US
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Volkeren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-20T10:36:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-20T10:36:43Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60996-
dc.description.abstractIt is frequently observed that the implementation of green policies is delayed compared to the initial announcement. Considering a setting with a representative monopolist extracting a non-renewable resource, we demonstrate that announcing a green policy, but then delaying its implementation, is associated with a larger cumulative extraction at any point in time than announcing a late implementation of this policy at the outset.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo Working Paper: Energy and Climate Economics 3844en_US
dc.subject.jelD92en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelK32en_US
dc.subject.jelQ32en_US
dc.subject.jelQ38en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordclimate policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcarbon taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordKyoto Protocolen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal controlen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwAnkündigungseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwErschöpfbare Ressourcenen_US
dc.subject.stwKontrolltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAnnouncing is bad, delaying is worse: Another pitfall in well-intended climate policyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn720579384en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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