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dc.contributor.authorAllen, Lindaen_US
dc.contributor.authorJagtiani, Julapaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPeristiani, Stavrosen_US
dc.contributor.authorSaunders, Anthonyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:29:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:29:27Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60720-
dc.description.abstractThis paper looks at the role of both commercial and investment banks in providing merger advisory services. In this area, unlike some areas of investment banking, commercial banks have always been allowed to compete directly with investment banks. In their dual role as lenders and advisors to firms that are the target or the acquirer in a merger, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function. However, banks acting as both lenders and advisors face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any certification effect. Overall, we find evidence supporting the certification effect for target firms. In contrast, conflicts of interest appear to dominate the certification effect when banks are advisors to acquirers. In particular, the target earns higher abnormal returns when the target's own bank certifies the (more informationally opaque) target's value to the acquirer. In contrast, we do not find a certification role for acquirers. There are two possible reasons for these different outcomes. First, it is the target firm, not the acquirer, that must be priced in a merger. Second, acquirers predominantly use commercial bank advisors to obtain access to bank loans that may be used to finance the merger. Thus, we find that acquirers tend to choose their own banks (those with prior lending relationships to the acquirer) as advisors in mergers. However, this choice weakens any certification effect and creates a potential conflict of interest because the acquirer's advisor negotiates the terms of both the merger transaction and future loan commitments. Moreover, the advising bank's recommendations may be distorted by considerations related to credit exposure incurred in both past and future lending activity. The market prices these conflicts of interest; we find significantly negative abnormal returns for bank advisors when they advise their own loan customers in acquiring other firms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFederal Reserve Bank of New York New York, NYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStaff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 143en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRelationship bankingen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestment bank advisorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommercial bank advisorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcertification effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordconflict of interest effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordmergersen_US
dc.subject.keywordacquisitionsen_US
dc.subject.stwFusionen_US
dc.subject.stwÜbernahmeen_US
dc.subject.stwBanken_US
dc.subject.stwInvestmentbanken_US
dc.subject.stwAnlageberatungen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleThe role of bank advisors in mergers and acquisitionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn345438531en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

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