Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60632
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dc.contributor.authorMartin, Antoineen_US
dc.contributor.authorOrlando, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorSkeie, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:26:48Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:26:48Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60632-
dc.description.abstractIn a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory that gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can pay a cost to access a central database that tracks payments made and received. Incentives must be provided to agents to access the central database and to produce when they participate in this arrangement. We also study policies that can loosen these incentive constraints. In particular, we show that a “no-surcharge” rule has good incentive properties. Finally, we compare our model with that of Cavalcanti and Wallace.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York |x263en_US
dc.subject.jelE59en_US
dc.subject.jelG29en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpayment networks, money, searchen_US
dc.subject.stwZahlungsverkehren_US
dc.subject.stwSuchtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePayment networks in a search model of moneyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn522100422en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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