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dc.contributor.authorEggertsson, Gauti B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLe Borgne, Ericen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:26:09Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:26:09Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60601-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician endogenously gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. Applied to monetary policy, this theory (i) formalizes the rationale for delegation highlighted by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and by Alan S. Blinder, former Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and (ii) does not rely on the inflation bias that underlies most existing theories of central bank independence. Delegation trades off the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract against the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) has less incentive to pander to public opinion than a politician. Our key theoretical predictions are broadly consistent with the dataen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFederal Reserve Bank of New York New York, NYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStaff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 205en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelJ45en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleThe politics of central bank independence: A theory of pandering and learning in governmenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn482609478en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

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