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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60470
  

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dc.contributor.authorJovanovic, Draganen_US
dc.contributor.authorWey, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-14T14:29:20Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-14T14:29:20Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-063-5en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60470-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the efficiency defense in merger control. First, we show that the relationship between exogenous efficiency gains and social welfare can be non-monotone. Second, we consider both endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiencies and find that merger proposals are largely aligned with a proper social welfare analysis which explicitly considers the without merger counterfactual. We demonstrate that the merger specificity requirement does not help much to select socially desirable mergers; to the contrary, it may frustrate desirable mergers inducing firms not to claim efficiencies at all.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE Discussion Paper 64en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordHorizontal Mergersen_US
dc.subject.keywordEfficiency Defenseen_US
dc.subject.keywordMerger Specific Efficienciesen_US
dc.subject.stwHorizontale Konzentrationen_US
dc.subject.stwFusionen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwFusionskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAn equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn720815673en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:64-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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