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Title:An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers PDF Logo
Authors:Jovanovic, Dragan
Wey, Christian
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:DICE Discussion Paper 64
Abstract:We analyze the efficiency defense in merger control. First, we show that the relationship between exogenous efficiency gains and social welfare can be non-monotone. Second, we consider both endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiencies and find that merger proposals are largely aligned with a proper social welfare analysis which explicitly considers the without merger counterfactual. We demonstrate that the merger specificity requirement does not help much to select socially desirable mergers; to the contrary, it may frustrate desirable mergers inducing firms not to claim efficiencies at all.
Subjects:Horizontal Mergers
Efficiency Defense
Merger Specific Efficiencies
JEL:K21
L13
L41
ISBN:978-3-86304-063-5
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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