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dc.contributor.authorKrämer, Janen_US
dc.contributor.authorVogelsang, Ingoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-13T10:39:04Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-13T10:39:04Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60389-
dc.description.abstractWith the use of a laboratory experiment, we show the effects of co-investments on coverage, competition and price collusion in regulated network industries. On the one hand, co-investments turn out not to be a significant driver of new infrastructure investments beyond the level achieved by access regulation and they seem to facilitate tacit price collusion. On the other hand, co-investments economize on infrastructure investment costs and necessitate communication, which partially offset the aforementioned effects. In fact, communication between the firms on their future coverage, especially outside co-investments, seems to have a positive effect on investments. However, the surprising message of the experiment is that tacit collusion happens under co-investment although there is no reason to believe that it should and although we made almost every effort to prevent it. Our results indicate that regulators should evaluate co-investments with scrutiny as there are definite drawbacks that must be considered.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherITS Wienen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries23rd European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunication Society, Vienna, Austria, 1-4 July 2012en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelL97en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnetwork industriesen_US
dc.subject.keywordco-investmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.titleCo-investments and tacit collusion in regulated network industries: Experimental evidenceen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn720905672en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:itse12:60389-
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