Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60233
Authors: 
Stark, Oded
Jakubek, Marcin
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 42
Abstract: 
A migration network is modeled as a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement between financially-constrained individuals who seek to finance and expedite their migration. The cooperation agreement creates a network: established migrants contract to support the subsequent migration of others in exchange for receiving support themselves. When the model is expanded to study cooperation between more than two migrants, it emerges that there is a finite optimal size of the migration network. Consequently, would-be migrants in the sending country will form a multitude of networks, rather than a single grand network. When the risk involved in participating in a cooperation agreement is incorporated, the propensity to enter an agreement is shown to depend positively on the cost of migration.
Subjects: 
Migration network
Schedule of migration
Sequential migration
Affinity
Interpersonal bonds
Cost of migration
JEL: 
D01
D71
D90
F22
F24
J61
O15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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