EconStor >
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt a. M. >
Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLibman, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.authorKozlov, Vladimiren_US
dc.contributor.authorSchultz, Andréen_US
dc.description.abstractThe paper investigates the influence of outside options on the predatory behavior of autocrats. An outside option is referred to as the opportunity of an incumbent ruler to continue his career outside his current territory of control. The paper uses data on the effectiveness of tax collection and the repressiveness of tax jurisprudence for Russian regions in 2007-2009 and finds that regions ruled by governors with substantial outside options are characterized by more repressive behavior of tax authorities. However, surprisingly, the same tax authorities collect less additional revenues for the public budget. It conjectures that the presence of an outside option induces autocrats to behave like roving bandits they use tax audits to establish control over regional companies, but exploit this control to extract private rents rather than revenues for the regional budget used for public goods provision.en_US
dc.publisherFrankfurt School of Finance & Management Frankfurt, M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper series, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 190en_US
dc.subject.keywordroving and stationary banditen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax auditingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpredatory governmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordRussian federalismen_US
dc.subject.stwAutoritäres Systemen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerliche Betriebsprüfungen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.titleRoving bandits in action: Outside option and governmental predation in autocraciesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
719261708.pdf405.96 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.