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Title:NATO's response force: Alle gode gange tre? PDF Logo
Authors:Ringsmose, Jens
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:DIIS Reports / Danish Institute for International Studies 2010:08
Abstract:I sommeren 2009 besluttede NATO-landenes forsvarsministre at ændre grundlæggende på Alliancens hurtige udrykningsstyrke - the NATO Response Force (NRF'en). Omstillingen er planlagt til at være fuldt implementeret allerede i juli 2010. Symptomatisk for de betydelige problemer, som har plaget NRF'en siden den blev erklæret en fuld operationel kapabilitet på Riga-topmødet i november 2006, er der tale om den anden omfattende ændring af styrken på mindre end tre år. Allerede i oktober 2007 godkendte NATO-landene en første nedskalering og omstrukturering af styrken. Post.doc. Jens Ringsmose giver i denne DIIS-rapport en vurdering af, hvordan NRF'en har fungeret til dato. Rapportens hovedargument er, at NRF'en har været en kvalificeret fiasko. På trods af at styrken har haft en ubestridelig transformationseffekt, så har de beskedne styrkebidrag og uenigheden om, hvor og hvornår styrken skal bringes i anvendelse, været med til at underminere dens troværdighed. Indtil nu har NRF'en derfor også haft en overvejende negativ indvirkning på NATO's renommé.
Abstract (Translated):At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) declared the NATO Response Force (NRF) a fully operational capability. Yet only 8 months later - and behind closed doors - the Alliance's military authorities rescinded the declaration as it became increasingly clear that member states were unwilling to make the necessary commitments to the force. To this day, the force has been a qualified failure: while many allies have benefited from participating in the NRF, lack of concrete troop commitments and disagreement as to the force's operational role have largely eroded its credibility. This cloud change with the allies' recent adoption of a revised NRF-construct. However, as NATO is still in a state of strategic confusion, the NRF is likely to continue to be different things to different nations.
ISBN:978-87-7605-399-4
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DIIS Reports, Danish Institute for International Studies

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