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dc.contributor.authorCurrarini, Sergioen_US
dc.contributor.authorMenge, Friederikeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-13T14:52:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-13T14:52:52Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59734-
dc.description.abstractMany Social Interactions display either or both of the following well documented phenomena. People tend to interact with similar others (homophily). And they tend to treat others more favorably if they are perceived to share the same identity (in-group bias). While both phenomena involve some degree of discrimination towards others, a systematic study of their relations and interplay is yet missing. In this paper we report thendings of an experiment designed to address this issue. Participants are exogenously and randomly assigned to one of two groups. Subsequently they play a sequence of eight games with either an in-group or an out-group member. Wend strong evidence of in-group bias when agents are matched exogenously. When agents can a ect who they are matched with, we nd strong evidence of homophily. However, in-group biases either decrease or disappear altogether under en-dogenous matching. Self selection of homophilous agents into in-group matches alone cannot explain this fact. We also show that homophily is strongly correlated with risk aversion, and we use this fact to provide an explanation for both the existence of homophily and the disappearance of in-group biases under endogenous matching.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development 37.2012en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIn-Group Biasen_US
dc.subject.keywordHomophilyen_US
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous Matchingen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordGame Theoryen_US
dc.titleIdentity, homophily and in-group biasen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn716255294en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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