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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59733
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| Title: | | River sharing and water trade  |
| Authors: | | Ansink, Erik Gengenbach, Michael Weikard, Hans-Peter |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development 17.2012 |
| Abstract: | | We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory. |
| Subjects: | | River Sharing Water Trade Market Emergence Property Rights Coalition Stability |
| JEL: | | C72 D74 H23 Q25 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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