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dc.contributor.authorSwanson, Timen_US
dc.contributor.authorGroom, Benen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-13T14:52:48Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-13T14:52:48Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59729-
dc.description.abstractWe distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones, where international cooperation is required. Global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions, in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands. The basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted, and those that have not. We demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by Nash, Rubinstein and others. There are benefits from global land conversion, and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted. Since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual (benefit sharing agreements, prior informed consent clauses) or very extreme (incremental cost contracts), the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved. For this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur, as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development 31.2012en_US
dc.subject.jelQ24en_US
dc.subject.jelQ28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordGlobal Biodiversityen_US
dc.subject.keywordInternational Environmental Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash Bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordRational Threatsen_US
dc.titleRegulating global biodiversity: What is the problem?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn715912712en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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