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dc.contributor.authorBosetti, Valentinaen_US
dc.contributor.authorCarraro, Carloen_US
dc.contributor.authorDe Cian, Enricaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMassetti, Emanueleen_US
dc.contributor.authorTavoni, Massimoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-13T14:52:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-13T14:52:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59715-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions' profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and potential stability of a number of coalitions which are potentially effective in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even potentially stable even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development 97.2011en_US
dc.subject.jelC68en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD58en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordClimate Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordClimate Coalitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordGame Theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordFree Ridingen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaveränderungen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleIncentives and stability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessmenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn683945076en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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