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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59713
  
Title:Coalition formation in generalized apex games PDF Logo
Authors:Karos, Dominik
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development 38.2012
Abstract:The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced hedonic game is analyzed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable partitions are stated and core stable partitions are characterized.
Subjects:Apex Games
Core Stability
Hedonic Games
Strong Monotonicity
JEL:C71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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