EconStor >
Northwestern University >
Kellogg School of Management - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University  >
Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59681
  
Title:Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media PDF Logo
Authors:Germano, Fabrizio
Meier, Martin
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1518
Abstract:Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large.
Subjects:media economics
media consolidation
media markets
advertising and commercial media bias
JEL:L13
L82
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
644260025.pdf493.86 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59681

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.