Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59681 
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dc.contributor.authorGermano, Fabrizioen
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-19-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:27Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59681-
dc.description.abstractWithin a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1518en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmedia economicsen
dc.subject.keywordmedia consolidationen
dc.subject.keywordmedia marketsen
dc.subject.keywordadvertising and commercial media biasen
dc.titleConcentration and self-censorship in commercial media-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn644260025en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1518en

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