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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59677
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| Title: | | A two-sided reputation result with long run  |
| Authors: | | Atakan, Alp E. Ekmekci, Mehmet |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1510 |
| Abstract: | | Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds. |
| Subjects: | | Repeated Games Reputation Equal Discount Factor Long-run Players War of Attrition |
| JEL: | | C73 D83 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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