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dc.contributor.authorDziuda, Wiolettaen_US
dc.contributor.authorLoeper, Antoineen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest and decreases the responsiveness of the bargaining outcome to the environment. In some cases, it can lead the negotiations to complete gridlock. Compared to a bargaining protocol with an exogenous status quo, the status quo stays in place more often and equilibrium welfare is lower. In a legislative setting, this model shows that the inertial effect of the endogenous status quo can be mitigated by concentrating decision power, and can be eliminated by sunset provisions.en_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1514en_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic votingen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous status quoen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy inertiaen_US
dc.subject.keywordsunset provisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordchecks and balancesen_US
dc.titleDynamic collective choice with endogenous status quoen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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