Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59674
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dc.contributor.authorDziuda, Wiolettaen_US
dc.contributor.authorLoeper, Antoineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:18Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59674-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest and decreases the responsiveness of the bargaining outcome to the environment. In some cases, it can lead the negotiations to complete gridlock. Compared to a bargaining protocol with an exogenous status quo, the status quo stays in place more often and equilibrium welfare is lower. In a legislative setting, this model shows that the inertial effect of the endogenous status quo can be mitigated by concentrating decision power, and can be eliminated by sunset provisions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1514en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic votingen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous status quoen_US
dc.subject.keywordpartisanshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolarizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy inertiaen_US
dc.subject.keywordsunset provisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordchecks and balancesen_US
dc.titleDynamic collective choice with endogenous status quoen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn641442947en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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