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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59673
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Harstad, Bård | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-10-25 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-07-12T12:34:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-07-12T12:34:17Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59673 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | I develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. If the agents can contract on provision levels, but not on investments, they invest suboptimally little, particularly if the contract is short-term or close to its expiration date. To encourage sufficient investments, the optimal and equilibrium contract is more ambitious if it is short-lasting, and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration date. If renegotiation is possible, such a contract implements the first best. The results have important implications for how to design a climate treaty. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanston | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1504 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H87 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q54 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F53 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dynamic private provision of public goods | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dynamic common-pool problems | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | dynamic hold-up problems | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incomplete contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | renegotiation design | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | climate change and climate agreements | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Incomplete contracts in dynamic games | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 637696034 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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