Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59671
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGomes, Renatoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPavan, Alessandroen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:16Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:16Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59671-
dc.description.abstractWe study second-degree price discrimination in markets where the product traded by the monopolist is access to other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the welfare and the profit-maximizing mechanisms to employ a single network or a menu of non-exclusive networks. We characterize the optimal matching schedules under a wide range of preferences, derive implications for prices, and deliver testable predictions relating the structure of the optimal pricing strategies to conditions on the distribution of match qualities. Our analysis sheds light on the distortions associated with the private provision of broadcasting, health insurance and job matching services.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1540en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmatchingen_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.titlePrice discrimination in many-to-many matching marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn670493457en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.13 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.