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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Loeper, Antoine | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-08 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-07-12T12:34:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-07-12T12:34:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient federal authority. We show that even if the size of the information to be elicited is minimal, the incentive compatibility constraint has a bite in terms of flexibility and welfare. Strategy-proof and efficient federal mechanisms are necessarily uniform. There exists inefficient and non-uniform strategy-proof mechanisms, but they are socially worse than non cooperative decentralization. Federal mechanisms which are neutral and robust to coalition manipulations are equivalent to voting rules on uniform policies. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, IL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiscussion Paper |x1521 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Federalism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Asymmetric Information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Strategy-proofness | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Externality | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Coordination | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Uniformity | en |
dc.title | Contractual federalism and strategy-proof coordination | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 651736129 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1521 | en |
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