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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Loeper, Antoine | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-03-08 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-07-12T12:34:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-07-12T12:34:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient federal authority. We show that even if the size of the information to be elicited is minimal, the incentive compatibility constraint has a bite in terms of flexibility and welfare. Strategy-proof and efficient federal mechanisms are necessarily uniform. There exists inefficient and non-uniform strategy-proof mechanisms, but they are socially worse than non cooperative decentralization. Federal mechanisms which are neutral and robust to coalition manipulations are equivalent to voting rules on uniform policies. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanston | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1521 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D71 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H77 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Federalism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Asymmetric Information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Strategy-proofness | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Externality | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Coordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Uniformity | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Contractual federalism and strategy-proof coordination | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 651736129 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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