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dc.contributor.authorLoeper, Antoineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:15Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:15Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670-
dc.description.abstractThis paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient federal authority. We show that even if the size of the information to be elicited is minimal, the incentive compatibility constraint has a bite in terms of flexibility and welfare. Strategy-proof and efficient federal mechanisms are necessarily uniform. There exists inefficient and non-uniform strategy-proof mechanisms, but they are socially worse than non cooperative decentralization. Federal mechanisms which are neutral and robust to coalition manipulations are equivalent to voting rules on uniform policies.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1521en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFederalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrategy-proofnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordExternalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordCoordinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordUniformityen_US
dc.titleContractual federalism and strategy-proof coordinationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn651736129en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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