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dc.contributor.authorKalai, Adamen_US
dc.contributor.authorKalai, Ehuden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:14Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59668-
dc.description.abstractSelfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient outcome among the many individually rational possibilities in a strategic game, and (2) establishing a play protocol under which strategic players may achieve this outcome. The paper presents a general solution for two-person Bayesian games with monetary payoffs, under a strong revealed-payoff assumption. The proposed solution builds upon earlier concepts in game theory. It coincides with the von Neumann minmax value on the class of zero sum games and with the major solution concepts to the Nash Bargaining Problem. Moreover, the solution is based on a simple decomposition of every game into cooperative and competitive components, which is easy to compute.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1512en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcooperative game theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon- cooperative game theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordmin-max valueen_US
dc.titleA cooperative value for Bayesian gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn637699017en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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