Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59657 
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dc.contributor.authorDe Castro, Luciano I.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-04-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:33:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:33:58Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59657-
dc.description.abstractAffiliation has been a prominent assumption in the study of economic models with statistical dependence. Despite its large number of applications, especially in auction theory, affiliation has limitations that are important to be aware of. This paper shows that affiliation is a restrictive condition and the intuition usually given for its adoption may be misleading. Also, other usual justifications for affiliation are not compelling. Moreover, some implications of affiliation - namely, equilibrium existence in first-price auctions and the revenue dominance of second-price auctions - do not generalize to other definitions of positive dependence.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1530en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordaffiliationen
dc.subject.keywordpositive dependenceen
dc.subject.keywordstatistical dependence of typesen
dc.subject.keywordconditional independenceen
dc.subject.keywordde Finetti's theoremen
dc.subject.keywordminimally informative random variableen
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen
dc.subject.keywordpure strategy equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordrevenue rankingen
dc.titleAffiliation, equilibrium existence and revenue ranking of auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn665455356en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1530en

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